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Abstract
This study aims to assess whether buyback activities in Malaysia are able to 
provide any economic benefits to shareholders both in the short-term and in 
the long-run. Specifically this study investigates the price effects on: (a) the 
announcement surrounding the repurchase intentions and implementation 
dates, (b) factors affecting the price effects on implementation dates and 
(c) long-run price effects subsequent to repurchase implementation. Using 
event study methodologies, this study finds no significant immediate 
price reactions surrounding repurchase intention dates. However, there 
is significant evidence of positive abnormal returns in days –5 to +5 
surrounding the announcement of repurchase implementation. As for the 
factors affecting abnormal returns, this study finds that abnormal return 
responds positively to better prior price performance, dividend yield, 
directors’ holdings, and fraction of shares repurchased. However, abnormal 
return responds negatively to the previous amount of cash held, reported 
earnings per share, and market-to-book value. Using a three year period 
as a measure of long-run, this study finds that there is no evidence that 
repurchasing firms experience superior or inferior price performance. This 
is one of the first studies in Malaysia to examine the long- run wealth effects 
of share repurchase.
Keywords: Share buybacks, shareholders’ wealth, corporate finance, long-
run performance, emerging, Malaysia.
Introduction
Share repurchases or share buybacks were legally allowed in Malaysia 
following the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In 1999, there were only 16 
firms that announced their repurchase intentions. In 2005, the number 
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of firms that engaged in repurchase announcements had increased to 
206, an increase of more than tenfold. 
   
Malaysia provides a unique setting to look at the announcement 
effects of repurchases since there are rules that have to be complied 
with. Before a firm could begin repurchasing its shares, it is required 
to submit a proposal of the repurchase intention to Bursa Malaysia 
and get shareholders’ approval through an extraordinary general 
meeting (EGM) or the annual general meeting (AGM) whereby at 
least 75 per cent shareholders’ approval must be obtained. However, 
this mandate is only valid for a maximum of one year until the next 
shareholders’ meeting. Furthermore, regulations do not allow a listed 
company to buy back more than 10 per cent of its issued and paid 
up capital or to hold more than 10 per cent of its shares as treasury 
shares. Getting shareholders’ approval does not mean that a firm has 
to engage in repurchase activities. Thus, there are many companies in 
Malaysia that ask for shareholders’ approvals but never go ahead with 
the actual repurchases. Abdul-Latif (2010) reports that out of 281 non-
financial companies that obtained approvals from their shareholders, 
130 companies never repurchased their shares while 70 companies 
repurchased less that 2 per cent of their shares cumulatively from 
1999 to 2006. Since a firm is allowed to announce its intention of 
repurchasing every year without even following through with 
actual repurchases, the first announcement might have little 
information effect. 
It can be argued that the announcements of actual repurchases 
have more information content compared to the announcement 
of repurchase intention as firms are backing up their claim of 
undervaluation with actions. Thus, to measure the wealth effects of 
repurchases, this study looks at both intention announcements and 
actual announcements of the very first repurchase as information 
content of subsequent repurchases might have been impounded into 
prices (Schipper & Thompson, 1983). Studies on actual repurchases 
are not as prevalent as studies on the announcement of repurchase 
intentions. The main reason is that the dates of actual repurchases 
cannot be ascertained. However, Malaysia is among the countries 
that require repurchasing firms to disclose their repurchase activities. 
For these countries, then, it is possible to measure the announcement 
effects of actual repurchases. The first part of this study then looks 
at the price effects following first announcements of intention to 
repurchase and first announcements of actual repurchase.
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In terms of ownership, since an average firm is tightly controlled by 
major shareholders, who in many cases also served on the 
board of directors, there are three major concerns. The first 
concern is that repurchases could be used to manipulate share 
prices to the benefits of the majority shareholders. In fact, this 
is a major concern of regulators. That might be the reason that 
before a repurchase could be carried out, it must get the approval 
from at least 75 per cent of the firm’s shareholders, which 
means that it will not squeeze out the minority shareholders from 
decision-making. If this concern is valid, we should find that directors’ 
holdings would affect announcement returns negatively. The second 
concern is that since directors hold, based on this study, about 42 per 
cent of the shares, false signalling might be a concern. A firm might 
falsely signal that it is undervalued when in fact it is not undervalued. 
Since firms in Malaysia are required to report to Bursa Malaysia, or 
the Malaysia Stock Exchange, about their repurchases, resale, or 
cancellation of repurchased shares no later than 6.30 p.m. on the date 
of repurchases, false signalling could be tested. Two variables are 
used to test for signalling; one is the performance of the share prices 
60 days before repurchases and the other is the fraction of shares 
repurchased in the year of repurchases. The third concern is that 
since directors’ wealth is tied up in the stock performance of a firm, 
and since prices reflect dividends, which are related to earnings, then 
there might be a higher tendency of firms to manage their earnings. By 
studying circulars to shareholders, Nasaruddin and Angappan (2004) 
find that firms engaged in repurchases to improve their reported 
EPS. In an efficient market, earnings manipulation would not lead 
to positive returns. Thus the second part of this study looks at firm 
characteristics or factors that influenced abnormal returns following 
actual repurchase announcements.  
   
One of the reasons given by managers in Malaysia to justify 
repurchases, as mentioned in circulars to shareholders, is to stabilize 
share prices. Thus, it is important that price performance is measured 
over a longer period. Thus for the third part, this study investigates 
the long-run performance, which is measured over a period of 36 
months following the actual repurchases. There is inconclusive 
evidence regarding whether repurchasing firms experience superior 
performance in the long-run. Ikenberry, Lakanishok, and Vermaelen 
(1995 and 2000) and Jaganathan and Stephens (2003) find that there 
exist long-term return drifts following open market repurchase 
announcements suggesting that the initial market reaction is 
incomplete. This implies that the economic benefit of repurchase may 
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not be fully realized immediately, but perhaps over a longer horizon. 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) believe 
that the long-term value of open market repurchase is very much 
dependent on the ability of managers to take advantage of valuation 
errors. Ikenberry et al. (1995) finds that on average repurchasing firms 
gained significant returns of 73.75 per cent while non-repurchasing 
firms experienced returns of 61.15 per cent, a marked difference of 
12.6 per cent in excess returns over a 3-year period. This finding 
suggests that managers of repurchasing firms are indeed correct 
about market-mispricing of their shares. Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee 
(2004) and Zhang (2005) also provide consistent findings. The fact 
that repurchasing firms experienced low abnormal returns prior to 
repurchase announcement but high abnormal returns after actual 
repurchase dates suggests that the market does not fully anticipate the 
long term economic benefits of repurchase. On the contrary, McNally 
and Smith (2007) using the Canadian repurchase dataset from 1987 
to 2000 demonstrate that there are no long-run abnormal returns 
evidenced after repurchase announcements and implementation if 
transaction costs are considered.
Literature Review
This section discusses the literature related to the three objectives 
mentioned in the previous section. The first subsection looks at 
the literature on announcement effects of repurchases, the second 
subsection looks at the characteristics that influenced abnormal 
returns, while the last part discusses the literature on long-run 
performance.
Announcement Effects of Repurchases
Studies in the US find significant positive abnormal returns 
surrounding repurchase announcements (see, for example, Comment 
& Jarrell, 1991; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Vermaelen, 1981). Studies 
show that the impact on returns would tend to depend on the type 
of repurchases employed; whether tender offers or open market 
(Lie, 2002; Vermaelen, 1981). The larger the size of repurchases, the 
bigger the impact would be on the firms’ returns. On average, the 
proportion of shares bought back by the US firms either through 
open market repurchases or tender offers was 5 per cent and 15 per 
cent respectively. As open market repurchases usually involve a 
smaller number of shares bought as compared to other methods of 
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repurchases, it is expected that open market repurchases would lead 
to marginal changes in prices.  For example, Lie (2002) reports that 
gain from tender offer repurchases is a statistically significant 8 per 
cent over a 3-day window period while Dann (1981) finds a mean 
rate of return of more than 3 per cent following the announcement 
of open market repurchases in the US for a 2-day window period. 
Vermaelen (1981) finds that on average, tender offer repurchases 
experienced a significant positive CAR of 15.7 per cent while open 
market repurchases gain a positive CAR of 3.62 per cent in a 16-day 
window period, (–5, +10 days). 
Mohamad Jais and Chin (2001), Lim and Bacha (2002) and Mansor, 
Zaidi and Swee Peng (2011) look at the announcement effects of 
repurchase programmes in Malaysia. These studies document that 
the market reacts positively to the announcements of repurchase 
which is consistent with the signalling hypothesis. On the other hand, 
Hanita (2004) finds that there is zero abnormal returns for repurchase 
announcements involving Malaysian companies. The difference 
in the results between these Malaysian studies might be due to the 
different periods, sample size, and methods employed. 
In Hong Kong, Zhang (2005) investigates share price performance 
of 135 actual repurchases between September 1993 and August 
1997. He finds that the market responds favourably following the 
actual implementation of repurchase as evidenced by a statistically 
significant positive mean CAR of 0.43 per cent in a three-day period 
from the announcement date to two days after the announcements. 
The mean CAR experienced by Hong Kong firms is economically 
small as compared to those experienced by the US.
Factors Influencing Abnormal Returns
It is expected that abnormal returns of a repurchase firm i from 
time t1 to t2, CARi,t1,t2, is related to the firm’s financial characteristics 
(see, for example, Chan et al., 2004; Grullon & Michaely, 2004; and 
Zhang, 2005). The undervaluation hypothesis states that firms 
engaged in share repurchase when they perceived that their shares 
are undervalued. If investors believe in the hypothesis, then prior 
returns (CAR60D) would affect CAR negatively with poor price-
performing firms earning higher returns on announcements. Ho, 
Liu and Ramanan (1997), Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Chan 
et al. (2004), among others, find that abnormal returns are negatively 
related to past return-performance, which provides support for the 
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undervaluation hypothesis. The effect of operating performance, 
as measured by LYEBITDA, on CAR is expected to be positive as 
firms with better performance could afford to repurchase more of 
their shares.  
The expected sign of LYCASH is positive given that firms with higher 
free cash flows could spend more to repurchase their shares. Jensen 
(1986) argues that firms with excess cash might spend the cash on non-
profitable activities. However, given that firms in Malaysia are tightly 
held, the tendency to misuse the excess funds might be alleviated. In 
this case, one might observe that firms with excess cash might use it 
to repurchase their shares.  Thus, it is expected CAR to be positively 
related to cash flows. 
Repurchase could be used as a tool to manage earnings per share. If 
a firm uses repurchases to influence its earnings per share, investors 
will interpret the repurchases as evidence of lower future earnings. 
Thus CAR is negatively related to EPS as measured by LYEPS. 
Director ownership, as proxied by LYDIR, is expected to influence 
CAR positively. The larger the director ownership, the greater is 
the wealth of the directors tied up with the performance of the firm. 
Therefore, if directors believe that their firm is undervalued, they 
have a greater incentive to signal to the market of the undervaluation 
through repurchases. 
CAR is expected to be positively related to the size of the repurchase 
(PBTNOS). If managers believe that their firms’ shares are undervalued 
and they are willing to spend a large amount of money to buy back 
their shares, then the action of buying back shares will send a credible 
claim that the firms’ shares are indeed undervalued. Firms with more 
growth opportunities, as measured by LYMTBV, have more reason to 
retain their cash to finance their investments. Therefore, if they buy 
back their shares, their action will signal to the market that in the 
future, they will have less investment opportunities and thus, their 
stock prices will fall following the repurchases. Accordingly, CAR is 
negatively related to LYMTBV.  
Long-run Performance of Repurchasing Firms
The long-term performance of open market repurchases depends 
on the ability of managers to take advantage of the valuation errors 
(Ikenberry et al., 1995; Ikenberry & Vermaelen, 1996; Zhang, 2002). 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) argue that managers have timing ability and 
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are almost always correct in their valuation. Their findings provide 
evidence that on average repurchasing firms gained significant 
returns of 73.75 per cent while non-repurchasing firms experienced 
returns of 61.15 per cent, a marked difference of 12.6 per cent in excess 
returns over a 3-year period. This finding suggests that managers of 
repurchasing firms are indeed correct about market mispricing of 
their shares. Chan et al. (2004) find that repurchasing firms exhibit 
significant positive cumulative abnormal performance of 23.56 per 
cent in 4 years following the announcement dates compared to non-
repurchasing firms. The fact that repurchasing firms experienced 
low abnormal returns prior to repurchase announcement but high 
abnormal returns after the announcement dates suggest that the 
market does not fully anticipate the long-term economic benefits of 
repurchases. Zhang (2005) also studies the long-term effects of firms 
that actually bought back their shares. He finds weak evidence that 
actual repurchasing firms experience better price performance in the 
long-run. He groups the sample firms into different clusters according 
to book-to-market value (BTMV) and finds that value firms (high 
BTMV ratios) perform significantly better than glamour firms (low 
BTMV) with abnormal returns of more than 20 per cent in a 3-year 
post actual implementation of repurchases. His findings suggest 
that at least value firms can deliver superior long-term performance 
to shareholders. Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2007) offer an extensive 
examination on post-announcement returns drift subsequent to 
repurchase announcements and implementations. Using a sample of 
5508 repurchase programmes by the US firms between 1980 and 1996, 
they find significant evidence that repurchasing firms (announcers 
and implementers) outperform non-repurchasing firms. In addition, 
value firms that implement repurchase programmes and buy back 
more shares enjoy even higher abnormal returns in a four–year period 
subsequent to the announcement dates. On average, value firms 
experience positive cumulative abnormal returns of 56.54 per cent in a 
four-year period following repurchase announcements while growth 
firms experience a positive 47.05 per cent in the same period. However, 
McNally and Smith (2007) find that there is no long-run abnormal 
return after repurchase announcements and implementations if 
transaction costs are considered. Similarly, Bradford (2008) finds no 
support to long-term abnormal returns subsequent to open-market 
repurchase announcements.
The above discussion shows that there are mixed findings on the 
long-run performance of repurchasing firms. Furthermore, there is no 
study that measures long-run performance in Malaysia. This study 
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fills in the void by providing evidence on the long-run performance 
from the perspective of a developing economy. 
Data and Methodology
This study focused on all non-financial public listed Malaysian 
companies that have announced and actually bought back more 
than 1 per cent of their shares cumulatively from 1999 to 2006. This 
process produced 81 companies. However, four companies were 
excluded as their first announcement dates could not be obtained, 
leaving a total sample of 77. To measure initial market reaction to 
repurchase announcements, the market model was employed. Two 
announcement dates were used. The first date was the first public 
announcements of the firms’ repurchase intention. The intention date 
was the earliest date available to the public as gathered either from 
the firm’s repurchase circular to the shareholders, firm’s repurchase 
notes to Bursa Malaysia or Bursa Malaysia’s approval date for the 
repurchase intention mentioned in each repurchase circular to the 
shareholders. The second date was the firm’s first announcement 
of repurchase implementation or the actual repurchase. The actual 
repurchase date is the date when the firms report their actual buying 
back activities to Bursa Malaysia. These reports are available online. 
Some researchers argue that there are no clear rules on how long 
the event and the  estimation period should be (see, for example, 
McKinlay, 1997 and event study tools, 2014). It is reported that a 
longer periods may promise greater accuracy but they also bear 
the risk of covering structural breaks due to confounding events 
and information leakage (Event study tools, downloaded 2014). 
MacKinlay (1997) suggests that the event period should include at 
least the announcement date. He elaborates that the event period can 
be longer than the specific event of interests to sufficiently capture the 
price effects of the announcements. This study used the 121-day event 
period, a long window period, to adequately capture any significant 
price changes due to possible information leakage. The estimation 
period of the market model is from day-200 to day-61 before the 
announcement date.
To test whether factors mentioned in the literature influenced 
abnormal returns following actual repurchases, the following model 
is estimated.
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CARi = b0 + b1CAR60Di + b2LYEBITDAi + b3LYCASHi + b4DYIELDi + 
b5LYEPSi + b6LYDIRi + b7LYMTBVi + b8PBTNOSi + ei Where,
CARi = Cumulative abnormal returns of firm i from one day 
before to one day after the announcement (day –1 to 
+1) of repurchase implementations of firm i.
CAR60Di = Cumulative market adjusted abnormal return in 
the previous 60 days before the announcement of 
repurchase implementations. 
LYEBITDAi = Last year EBITDA of firm i, where EBITDA is the 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization to total assets.
LYCASHi = Last year cash holding ratio of firm i.
DYIELDi = Dividend yield of firm i. Dividend yield is calculated 
as cash dividends paid scaled by the firm’s market 
value of equity.
LYEPSi = Last year EPS of firm i.
LYDIRi = The total percentage of share held by directors of 
firm i (directly and indirectly) in the previous year.
LYMTBVi = Prior year firm i market value to book value of equity. 
PBTNOSi = The actual number of shares bought back by 
firm i during the year scaled by ordinary shares 
outstanding.
To measure long-run performance, cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAAR) and buy and hold returns (BHAR) are estimated over 
a 3-year period subsequent to repurchase implementations.
Findings and Discussion
Announcement Effects on Intention Date
Table 1 shows that that the cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) is negative prior to the announcement of repurchase 
intentions as measured by the event window of day-60 to –1. During 
this period, the market model shows a return of –3.7 per cent though it 
is not statistically significant. This result is consistent with the findings 
documented in previous studies that repurchase announcements 
were preceded by poor price performance (see, for example, Zhang, 
2005; and Ikenberry et al., 1995). As for performance after the 
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announcement of repurchase intentions, there is a significant positive 
abnormal return of 7.1 per cent in the 61-day period starting from the 
announcement date. When shorter window periods are used, there is 
no evidence of significant abnormal returns. Abnormal returns over 
a 3-day, 7-day and 11-day periods surrounding the announcement of 
repurchase intentions are –0.07 per cent, –0.09 per cent and 1.42 per 
cent respectively and they are all not significant at 10 per cent level.
Table 1
CAAR Surrounding Repurchased Intentions
Window period CAAR z-score p-value
–60, +60 0.034054 0.897023 0.369707
–60, –1 –0.036682 –1.372138 0.170021
0, + 60 0.070736 2.624217 0.008685***
–5, +5 0.014158 1.236845 0.216145
–3, +3 –0.000958 –0.104916 0.916442
–1, +1 –0.000704 –0.117788 0.906235
0, +3 0.000113 0.016302 0.986994
AAR day 0 0.00165 0.47913 0.63184
AAR day +1 –0.00064 –0.18459 0.85355
*** denotes significant at 1% level.
Overall, it can be said that the market is not surprised by the 
announcement of repurchase intentions.  This is partly due to the 
Malaysian policy regarding repurchase. It is mandatory for listed firms 
to submit their annual repurchase intentions to Bursa Malaysia and 
table them in their annual general meeting (AGM) prior to repurchase 
implementation. Since implementation of repurchase programmes are 
not mandatory, many firms regard the announcement of repurchase 
intentions as routine and therefore these announcements are usually 
squeezed in the firms’ AGM agenda. 
Price Reactions on Actual Repurchase Dates
This section presents the price effects associated with the firms’ 
announcement of repurchase implementation. To reduce 
the confounding effects associated with multiple repurchase 
announcements, this study uses only the first actual repurchase 
dates which are gathered from the “immediate announcement 
report” after the actual repurchase implementation are available 
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through the Bursa Malaysia website. Table 2 summarizes CAAR 
during several window periods. CAAR prior to the announcement of 
actual repurchases, from  –60 to –1, is an insignificant –2.19 per cent. 
Similar to the announcement of repurchasing intentions, repurchase 
implementations are preceded by the underperformance of firms, 
even though it is not significant. 
Table 2 
CAAR Surrounding Repurchase Implementations
Window CAAR Z-score p-value
–60, +60 0.015395 0.436259 0.662649
–60, –1 –0.021908 –0.881635 0.377974
0, +60 0.037302 1.488809 0.136538
–5, +5 0.030316 2.849338 0.004381***
–3, +3 0.030965 3.648303 0.000264***
–1, +1 0.012053 2.169201 0.030067**
0, +3 0.025650 3.997885 0.000064***
AAR day 0 0.006798 2.110250 0.027704**
AAR day +1 0.001125 0.349157 0.530661
AAR day +2 0.008119 2.520281 0.009327***
AAR day +3 0.008512 2.642364 0.006549***
*, **, *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Table 2 shows significant price reactions in several window periods. 
A significant average abnormal return of 0.68 per cent on the date 
of actual repurchase announcements is observed. This suggests that 
when firms start buying back their shares which conveys a strong 
signal that their shares are indeed undervalued, market starts reacting 
positively. It is also interesting to note that repurchase firms continue 
to experience significant positive AAR up to three days subsequent to 
the initial repurchase dates.
Table 2 also shows that abnormal returns are statistically significant 
in short window periods: (–5 to +5), (–5 to +5), (–1 to +1), and (0 to +3). 
In these periods, firms that announced repurchase implementation 
experience positive CAAR ranging from 2.6 to 3.1 per cent with 5 
per cent significant level. The result is consistent with the findings in 
several studies; see, for example, Mansor, Ghani and Lee (2011), Zhang 
(2005), Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004), and Jaganathan and Stephen 
(2003). However, the average abnormal returns appeared to be small 
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in this study as compared to those experienced by repurchase firms 
in the US markets. Two explanations can be offered to explain the 
smaller returns in Malaysia. First, since the firms’ actual repurchase 
transactions are partly anticipated, abnormal returns should be small 
in comparison to the unexpected announcement. In Malaysia, it is 
mandatory that firms got the Bursa’s approval and shareholders’ 
mandate prior to embarking on share repurchase. Second, given that 
on average the number of bought shares by Malaysian firms are small 
(on average it is about 1 per cent of outstanding shares) in comparison 
to those bought back in the US (on average it is about 6 – 7 per cent 
of outstanding shares), then the price reaction would be smaller. 
The larger the number of shares bought back, the stronger the signal 
the firm is sending that its shares are undervalued and therefore the 
better the price reactions are.
Returns from four days to 60 days after the announcements of 
actual repurchase are an insignificant 2.05 per cent. This result is 
consistent with efficient market notion. In an efficient market, news 
should be impounded in prices around the announcement dates and 
there should not be any drift, either upward or downward, after the 
announcements.
Factors Effecting Abnormal Returns
It is expected that abnormal returns of a repurchasing firm i from 
time t1 to t2, CARi,t1,t2, is related to the firm’s financial characteristics 
(see, for example, Chan et al., 2004; Grullon & Michaely, 2004; 
and Zhang, 2005). A multivariate regression is then estimated to 
measure whether the financial characteristics affect the abnormal 
returns associated with actual repurchase announcements. For this 
study, the actual date of repurchase implementation is used rather 
than the announcement date. It is difficult to ascertain the exact first 
announcement date simply because there is a lot of noise associated 
with the proposed repurchase date. The first date of announcements 
is when firms seek approval to buy back shares from Bursa Malaysia. 
Then the firms would announce their intention to buy back their 
shares to their shareholders in their annual general meeting (AGM). 
It is also common to see firms announce their repurchase intentions in 
their firms’ annual reports prior to the AGM meeting. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the 77 sample firms. On 
average, the percentage of shares repurchased is 2.2 per cent and 
the percentage of directors’ shareholdings is relatively high at 42.2 
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per cent. The shareholding patterns show that firms in Malaysia are 
tightly held. Firms tend to repurchase their shares when the past 
60-day performance is negative. This might show that the firms are 
signalling that their shares are undervalued.
  
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics on Variables Used in the Regression Model
Variable Average Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum
CAR(–1, +1) 0.0124518 0.0527256 –0.0815758 0.2597276
CAR60D –0.0143637 0.2211623 –0.633133 0.468984
LYEBITDA 0.0657976 0.2018448 –1.114434 0.326468
LYCASH 0.1289713 0.1265201 0.0002451 0.7773893
DYIELD 0.024774 0.0241205 0 0.10148
LYEPS 0.1382719 0.2489011 –0.7289 1.404
LYDIR 0.4219852 0.1814069 0.000 0.7594
LYMKTBV 1.054416 0.8229384 0.24 5.96
PBTNOS 0.021954 0.0266927 0.00002 0.17018
Table 4 summarises the results of the regression analysis. Based on the 
undervaluation hypothesis, it is expected that prior price performance 
would negatively affect the abnormal returns. However, it is found 
that the 60-day return prior to the actual repurchase dates (CAR60D), 
a measure of undervaluation, positively affects price performance. 
This result shows that investors reacted positively to repurchase 
implementations of firms that had better prior price performance 
and this contradicts the findings of, among others, Ho et al. (1997), 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Chan et al. (2004). One possible 
explanation is that since firms in Malaysia are tightly held and owners’ 
wealth is tied up to the firms’ price performance, investors are wary 
those firms would use repurchases to manipulate their share prices. 
Thus, even though repurchases are welcomed, investors reacted more 
positively to repurchases initiated by firms that had better prior price 
performance. It seems that signalling by prior price performance does 
not lead to higher price for firms with poor prior price performance.  
Even though the sign of operating performance, as measured by 
the prior year firms’ profit level (LYEBITDA), is positive it is not 
significant. Contrary to expectation, prior cash holdings, LYCASH, 
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have a negative effect on abnormal returns.  One possible explanation 
is that firms with large cash holdings that undertake repurchases 
are sending a signal to investors that they have less investment 
opportunities in the future. Thus, investors react negatively to their 
actions of buying back shares.
Table 4
Regression Results
Variable Coefficient t-stat p-value
Constant –0.0288 –1.26 0.212
CAR60D 0.0273 1.68 0.097*
LYEBITDA 0.0098 0.48 0.633
LYCASH –0.0711 –2.68 0.009***
DYIELD 0.4422 1.90 0.062*
LYEPS –0.0448 –2.41 0.019**
LYDIR 0.0788 2.42 0.018**
LYMTBV –0.0096 –2.05 0.045**
PBTNOS 1.0166 2.83 0.006***
F-stat 4.35 (p-value =0.0003)
R-squared 0.343
*, **, *** denote significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dividend yield (DYIELD) affects abnormal returns positively. 
LYDYLD is used as a measure of growth opportunities. High 
dividend yield firms are considered to have less growth opportunities. 
Therefore, for these firms, if they undertake repurchases, investors 
would react positively since free cash would not be used to finance 
negative net present value projects. The prior year reported EPS 
(LYEPS) negatively affects abnormal returns. It seems that investors 
interpret that firms are manipulating their EPS through repurchases. 
Therefore, investors react negatively to repurchase implementations. 
This result demonstrates that it does not pay to manipulate EPS. As 
expected, director holdings (LYDIR) positively affect price reactions 
of repurchases. Thus, the concern that directors might act on their 
own self-interests at the expense of the minority shareholders is 
unfounded. The firm’s growth opportunities as measured by LYMTBV 
negatively affect abnormal returns as hypothesised. Repurchases 
initiated by high growth firms are interpreted as a signal of lower 
growth opportunities in the future and consequently, abnormal 
returns are lower. The amount of shares bought back during the year 
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as measured by PBTNOS significantly affects abnormal returns. This 
shows that the greater the number of shares repurchased, the stronger 
is the signal that the shares are traded below their intrinsic value, thus 
the better the abnormal returns would be. Therefore, the percentage 
of shares repurchased could be used to signal either undervaluation 
or better future performance.
Long-run Price Performance
The sample in the long-run price performance uses the firms that 
bought back their shares, from the previous section. Monthly prices 
of all the 77 firms are gathered from one month prior to the first actual 
repurchase dates to 36 months post actual repurchase dates (–1 to 
+36 months). This study employed two methods of abnormal returns 
which were: (a) cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) and 
(b) buy and hold returns (BHAR).
The returns of the repurchasing firms have to be compared against 
some benchmark to measure the performance of the repurchasing 
firms. Two benchmarks for price performance are applied: (a) the 
market benchmark approach using the Bursa Malaysia Composite 
Index (KLCI) and (b) the matching firm approach as recommended 
by Barber and Lyon (1997). To identify matching firms, market value 
and market-to-book value of each repurchasing firm in the month 
prior to the actual repurchase month would be matched against 
those of other firms. Firms with the lowest Euclidean distance are 
chosen as matching firms. Euclidean distance is measured in the 
following manner:
D  =
where,
MVb : Market value of repurchasing firm b in the month prior to 
the month of actual repurchase
MVi : Market value of firm i
MTBVb : Market-to-book value of repurchasing firm b in the month 
prior to the month of actual repurchase
MTBVi : Market-to-book value of firm i
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Three groups of matching firms are used which are: (a) 1-match firm, 
(b) 2-match firms and (c) 4-match firms. Matching is done one month 
before the first actual repurchase dates. Long-run performance might 
also be influenced by the way the adjusted returns are weighted. 
Therefore, both equal-weighted and value-weighted measures are 
used to investigate the effects of size on long-run performance.
Table 5 summarizes the goodness of fit between repurchasing firms 
and matching firms. The average market value of the repurchasing 
firms is RM558.5453 million and the market-to-book value is 1.0665. If 
matching is done on a one-to-one basis, then the average market value 
and the market-to-book value of the matching firms are RM545.2309 
million and 1.0317 respectively. The paired sample difference in 
means is not significant for both variables with the p-values of the 
differences in market value and the market-to-book value of 0.9353 
and 0.77478 respectively. Therefore, the null hypotheses that the 
characteristics of the matching firms are similar to those of the 
repurchasing firms cannot be rejected. As the number of matches 
is increased, the differences between repurchasing firms and their 
matches are still not significant. Thus, it shows that the characteristics 
of the matches reflect the characteristics of the repurchasing firms.  
Table 5 
Goodness-of-Fit of the Matching Firms
MV of 
repurchasing
companies
MV of 
matching
companies
P-value of 
difference 
in MV
MTBV of 
repurchasing
companies
MTBV of 
matching
companies
P-value of 
difference 
in MTBV
1- match 558.5453 545.2309 0.9353 1.0665 1.0317 0.7747
2- match 558.5453 543.2732 0.9260 1.0665 1.0334 0.7819
4- match 558.5453 518.6670 0.7963 1.0665 1.0253 0.7248
*, indicates significant at 10% level (2-tailed tests).
MV is market value while MTBV stands for market-to-book value. 
P-value of difference in variable is based on t-test of the difference 
in paired samples between repurchasing firms and their matches. 
In case of two or four matches per repurchasing firm, the difference 
is calculated by taking the difference between average value of the 
matches and the repurchasing firm.
Table 6 presents the buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) over the 36-month 
period.  Both equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) buy-
and-hold raw returns, summarized in columns 1 and 2 respectively, 
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show that after the actual implementation of repurchases, share prices 
of the repurchasing firms increase. 
At the end of the three-year period, the EW raw return is 14.39 
per cent, which is significant at 10 per cent level, and the VW raw 
return is 17.80 per cent, which is significant at 5 per cent level. Thus 
it seems that managers repurchased their firms’ shares when they 
believed that the shares were undervalued. However, when a firm’s 
raw returns are adjusted using a benchmark’s returns, the results do 
not become significant over the three-year period. Columns 3 and 
4 show the EW and VW buy-and-hold abnormal returns when the 
Bursa Malaysia Composite Index is used as the benchmark. Even 
though the EW BHAR at the end of  the 30-month period of –13.56 
per cent is marginally significant at 10 per cent, it is not becoming 
significant over the three year period. However, the VW BHAR is 
not significant at the end of 30-month or 36-month period. Thus it 
seems that the underperformance of the EW-BHAR is driven by small 
firms. When the sample is divided into two groups based on size, 
the group of smaller firms shows an underperformance of –23.11 per 
cent over a 36-month period, when the EW approach is used, and 
the underperformance is significant at 10 per cent while the group of 
larger firms shows an insignificant abnormal return of –2.55 per cent. 
The results are summarized in Table 7.    
When matching firms are used as the benchmarks, the results are 
similar to those of the Bursa Malaysia Composite Index, i.e. 
the performance of repurchasing firms does not differ from 
the performance of matching firms over the three-year period, 
irrespective of the number of matching firms that is used. Columns 5 
to 10 of Table 6 summarize the results when matching firms are used. 
However, it is interesting to note that the underperformance of the 
VW BHAR is driven by larger firms when matching firms are used as 
the benchmarks as compared to the previous result when the Bursa 
Malaysia Composite Index is used as the benchmark.
Table 6 documents that there are no significant abnormal returns 
gained for repurchasing firms over the long-run (30 to 36 months) 
regardless of the groups used with the exception of the index-matching 
EW-BHAR. It is argued that the result for the index-matching EW-
BHAR could be driven by firm size. Table 7 demonstrates the effect 
of firm size on the firm’s abnormal returns after firm size has been 
considered. It is found that there was no difference in abnormal 
returns gained by large companies over the long-run, but small firms 
experienced significant negative returns. Therefore, the significant 
negative abnormal returns experienced by the EW BHAR were indeed 
driven by company size.
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Table 7
 
BHAR Based on Equal-Weighted Approach of Small and Large Repurchasing 
Firms when Bursa Malaysia Composite Index is Used as the Benchmark
Month
Small firms (n=38) Large firms (n=39)
BHAR P-value BHAR P-value
6 –2.784% 0.510 1.247% 0.789
12 –7.900% 0.141 9.555% 0.366
18 –16.814% 0.024** 0.978% 0.906
24 –20.713% 0.036** 1.077% 0.924
30 –20.432% 0.062* –6.863% 0.526
36 –23.109% 0.073* –2.545% 0.839
*, **,*** indicate significant at 10%,5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Table 8 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) 
over the 36-month period. The results are similar to those of BHAR. 
As for the raw returns, it seems that managers repurchased their 
firms’ shares when they believed that the shares were undervalued. 
Both the EW and VW CAAR are significant over the three-year 
period with the EW CAAR showing a return of 17.06 per cent 
and the VW CAAR showing a return of 22.67 per cent. Both 
returns are significant at 1 per cent-level. However, when the 
repurchasing firms’ returns are adjusted using benchmarks, the 
return over the three-year period is not significant. Similar to 
the results of BHAR, the underperformance of the EW CAAR 
compared to the VW CAAR is driven by smaller firms when the 
Bursa Malaysia Composite Index is used as the benchmark (refer to 
Table 9) and the underperformance of the VW CAAR is driven by 
larger firms when matching firms are used as the benchmarks. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the results of the long-run 
performance show that there is no different in price performance 
between repurchasing firms and their benchmarks, irrespective of the 
types of benchmarks being used. This finding is consistent with the 
findings of McNally and Smith (2007). This finding shows that the 
market in Malaysia is efficient in terms of the long-run performance 
of repurchasing firms.
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Table 9
CAAR Based on Equal-Weighted Approach of Small and Large Repurchasing 
Firms when Bursa Malaysia Composite Index is Used as the Benchmark
Small firms (N=38) Large firms (N=39)
Month CAAR P-value CAAR P-value
6 –3.178% 0.443 –0.046% 0.991
12 –5.711% 0.250 2.659% 0.709
18 –14.728% 0.027** –4.564% 0.597
24 –16.473% 0.039** –5.534% 0.568
30 –15.770% 0.082* –8.697% 0.379
36 –18.022% 0.064* –3.644% 0.715
*, **, *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Conclusion
This study addresses three main issues regarding the price 
impacts of repurchasing activities which are: (a) price performance 
surrounding the announcement of repurchasing intentions and 
implementations, (b) factors affecting abnormal returns and, (c) long-
run price performance following repurchasing implementations. 
The results indicate that the market is indifferent to announcements 
of repurchasing intentions but responds positively to repurchasing 
implementations. As for the factors affecting abnormal returns, this 
study finds that abnormal return responds positively to better prior 
price performance, dividend yield, directors’ holdings, and fraction of 
shares repurchased. However, abnormal return responds negatively 
to the previous amount of cash held, reported earnings per share, and 
market-to-book value. There is no difference in price performance 
between repurchasing firms and their benchmarks, irrespective of 
the types of benchmarks being used. This study concludes that there 
is no difference in price performance between buyback firms and 
controlled firms in the long-run. Though extant empirical evidence 
suggests that one of the reasons firms buy back shares is for economic 
gains, it is evidenced from this study that Malaysian firms do not 
achieve economic gain in the long run. Further analysis is warranted 
to determine the real reasons for Malaysian companies to buy 
back shares.
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